patterns; using these as reference points, elements of an alternative anti-violence, rule of law strategy are suggested.
Introduction
Bombs in crowded cafes blind. Th e blast radius delineates immediate victimhood, but such attacks can also blind the state to the consequences of its 'anti-terrorist' actions. Globally, patterns are emerging that profoundly challenge prevailing orthodoxies: legal regimes employed to 'combat terrorism' can apparently promote the enemy they claim to destroy; and 'taking the gloves off ' seems rarely to work for the law based state (hands just get dirty).
Clearly, there are problems at the technocratic (planning and execution) level. But this chapter argues that problems are more deeply rooted: that dominant 'anti-terrorist' discourses are constructed in ways that conceal unpalatable consequences; that these discourses [mis-]shape policy; and that responsibility for overall shortcomings lies at least as much at these levels as with operatives at the sharp end.
Th e chapter begins with a critique of some infl uential anti-terrorist legal discourses. It then sets out an alternative socio-legal model of law's role in situations of insurgency and terrorism in the state ideologically committed to the 'rule of law' (the ' rechtsstaat '). Th is explores not only the state's engagement with law in its attempt to deal with its enemies (a 'top-down' perspective), but also law's operation within the civilian population from whom violent actors spring ('bottom-up'). Th is model is then employed to analyse four confl ict sites separated widely by geography and types of legal system. Comparisons facilitate identifi cation of cross-jurisdictional
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unless he is tortured to locate it, many people will die. Dershowitz recommends a system of judicial 'torture warrants' authorizing the insertion of needles under the suspect's nails. Th e pain will cause him to disclose the location; lives will be saved; and the tactic is therefore eff ective. Torture tends to happen anyway, and should be institutionalized and thereby delimited.
Quite apart from moral objections, Dershowitz's sleight of hand is to shift from torture being eff ective with one 'ticking bomb' terrorist to being an eff ective counterterrorist tactic in general. Empirical evidence (discussed below) suggests that torturing one can radicalize one hundred. Some may become new bombers, multiplying the problem several-fold. Furthermore, institutionalizing controlled torture sends messages to security personnel that torture is acceptable, risking downward spirals of 'informal' torture, extremist radicalization, and violence. It is not that Dershowitz addresses and dismisses the 'messaging' issue -he simply ignores it. Th e view of law he employs is highly normative, with law operating in a 'top down' manner.
Few of the main contributors take the trouble to assemble original empirical material on terrorism, or terrorists 4 -indeed an antipathy towards primary studies can be evident. For instance Wilkinson's Terrorism versus Democracy: Th e Liberal State Response 5 relies entirely on secondary or tertiary data. Th is use is highly selective, seemingly limited to data supporting the author's thesis. Despite drawing frequently on Northern Ireland, the work entirely ignores all the key empirical studies on special courts and emergency powers in the region. 6 Wilkinson's approach helps to 4 See DW Brannan, PF Esler, and NT Anders Strindberg, 'Talking to "Terrorists": Towards an Independent Analytical Framework for the Study of Violent Substate Activism' (2001) 24 Studies in Confl ict and Terrorism 3.
5 Wilkinson (n 2). 6 Probably the most important reference points were a series of internationally celebrated primary empirical studies by Professor Tom Hadden and associated contributors, for example T Hadden, K Boyle, and P Hillyard, Ten Years on in Northern Ireland (Th e Cobden Trust, London 1980). 
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258 explain how, in his earlier Terrorism and the Liberal State , he could be so emphatic in his approval of internment without trial in Northern Ireland. 7 It is now clear that internment's introduction was a marked failure (in the book's second edition the claim has disappeared). 8
In much of the literature the result tends to be portrayals of irrational, mindless, sociopathic, or evil individuals, whose capacity for indiscriminate violence is limited only by availability of weaponry. A number of consequences fl ow: since the threat is potentially unlimited, particularly harsh measures are required. As terrorists are mindless, their entrepreneurship, and specifi cally their capacity creatively to exploit the state's mistakes, is ignored. And opportunities for peace may be overlooked by analyses of insurgents' goals informed by 'mindlessness' paradigms. Th e dynamic appears to be that trusted individuals are facilitated to acquaint themselves with offi cial security thinking. Insights thereby gained are fed into their analyses, which are then incorporated in policy elaboration, producing loops of continual reinforcement.
Building a Law and Social Movement Model
'Top-down' views of law can help solve some legal puzzles, but have a number of shortcomings in current contexts: (1) they neglect a key insight of the 'law and society' movement -law's 'Janus-faced' quality -simultaneously a tool of repression and source of challenger empowerment; 9 (2) they contribute little to solving the conundrum of why 'anti-terrorist' law can be counter-productive; (3) their focus on positive norms tends to underplay the signifi cance of situations where security forces act outside their powers.
Th e alternative 'bottom-up' model employed here looks at law less as a multiplicity of norms than primarily as 'particular traditions of knowledge and communicative practice' 10 in which messaging around law is a major concern (messaging occurs when norms are complied with and when they are not). Deracinated views of terrorists are rejected as inaccurate; 11 rather the model analyses the state's violent challengers through the lens of social movement theory. Such groups have agency, and the analysis uses this capacity to provide an account of security law's potentially counter-productive eff ects. 
Th e Case Studies
Four jurisdictions have been selected to provide a spread of contexts, legal systems, and geography in analysing the complexities of political violence and the rechtsstaat : Northern Ireland (1968-1998), the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) , the Federal Republic of Germany , and apartheid era South Africa . In many contemporary 'legal responses to terrorism' conversations, it tends to be assumed that the rechtsstaat is coincident with liberal democracy, but this can be misleading. South Africa's apartheid era racialist constitution denied it any claims to be considered 'democratic'. It nevertheless considered itself a rechtsstaat , and its judges sometimes displayed willingness to challenge state action. 12 Furthermore, while a liberal democratic state may subject itself to the rule of law within its borders, it may employ lesser standards when acting outside. While Israel is frequently considered a democratic rechtsstaat within its pre-1967 borders, the Israeli legal system does not apply in the OPT (apart from East Jerusalem). It is therefore not generally possible to invoke this system to challenge security force activities; however such actions may be challenged before the Supreme Court of Israel for incompatibility with international law. 13
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A further problem occurs where the state overall is liberal democratic, but where it contains a confl icted region with severe democratic and/or rule of law defi cits ('brown zones'). 14 Th is was the case with Northern Ireland where for much of its existence the state lacked the consent of up to 40 per cent of the population. For decades, only thin rule of law adherence obtained (although thickening occurred during the confl ict). Germany had the clearest case to be considered both rechsstaat and liberal democracy, though even here claims of signifi cant rights violations surfaced (see below).
Nomenclature in relation to exceptional legislation is not common across the confl ict sites. For ease of reference, the term 'security' is used here (referring to protecting the dominant group's security). Th e structure of such powers in Northern Ireland, South Africa, and the OPT shares family resemblances -all were under British rule at some time. An original emergency statute/ordinance existed, incorporating a delegated power to make wide ranging regulations (Table 1 , column 2). Th ese were later supplemented or replaced by anti-terrorist Acts (Table 1 , column 3). Th ere also existed legislation that while not badged as exceptional, nevertheless had an equivalent eff ect (Table 1 , column 4).
Much of the substantive content of security legislation and regulations was broadly similar in all three sites. Th is included powers to arrest, detain, and interrogate for extended periods on vague grounds; to conduct warrantless searches; to assign or limit residence; to operate checkpoints; to proscribe organizations; and to detain without trial indefi nitely. In general, the South African and Israeli provisions were more draconian than those in Northern Ireland. In all three sites, legislation was frequently drafted to be 'catch-all' and 'judge-proof '. It cast the net wide to include all possible suspects even if innocent people were also caught up; and it aimed to limit the potential for judicial interference, typically by excluding 'reasonableness' requirements in security powers. 15 In Northern Ireland, the ordinary mechanisms for prosecuting criminality applied to alleged security force misbehaviour, but in practice prosecutions were very rare. In the OPT the Israeli military ruled on its own alleged criminality through its courts-martial system. In South Africa (from 1986) 16 an attempt was made to short circuit prosecutions, with a regulation providing for prospective indemnity. Where security forces engaged in multiple killings attracting international attention, the response in Northern Ireland (paratroopers killed 13 civil rights protesters on Germany was the outlier in several respects: it was the only jurisdiction where courts could strike down legislation by reference to a written constitution. While the state made provision for emergency powers in 1968 (the 'Notstandsgesetze'), these were not invoked in dealing with terrorism. Rather a number of 'Anti-Terror' Acts were adopted (Table 1 , column 3) that signifi cantly eroded the accused's right to choose his or her legal team; that provided for trial in absentia ; and that permitted temporary incommunicado detention of prisoners. 23 Membership of a terrorist organization was made a crime, and powers were granted to search entire apartment blocks. But there were no special powers to arrest and detain (except for a 12 hour power to determine identity), as were typical in the jurisdictions explored above.
In South Africa, Northern Ireland, and the OPT, there was rule of law erosion at multiple levels, of which three are focused on here. Th e fi rst was the use of 'delegated' law-making. Th is was very pronounced in South Africa, and an equivalent result was arrived at in the OPT under the 'Military Order' system under which the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) create, apply, and enforce the law. In Northern Ireland, it was a lesser issue, as the Special Powers Act was repealed fi ve years into the confl ict. Delegation removes law-making from parliament, thereby minimizing scrutiny; in eff ect the executive or the security apparat is made a legislator. Th e second springs from the view that law in the rechtsstaat is to mediate the stateindividual relationship. Th e 'catch-all' drafting of the above security powers limits this mediating potential -people arrested under sweeping laws fi nd it diffi cult to bring successful false arrest actions; this is also true of 'judge-proofi ng' security powers. Th e third relates to lack of accountability for security forces, either though non-prosecution or through fl awed inquiries, where serious infractions are believed to have occurred. Whereas the rule of law requires that security forces be subject to the law, this suggests that they are partly above it. In Germany, rule of law erosion was generally less marked, but was signifi cant in relation to a cluster of issues around prisoner isolation and lawyer access (below).
Social Movements and the Law
In analysing the emergence and development of insurgent or terrorist groups, social movement theory draws centrally on three analytical devices: 'mobilizing structures', 'framing processes', and 'political opportunity structures'. 'Mobilizing structures' refer to 'collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action'. 24 When structures gel, the result is the 'social movement organization' (SMO), which, with linked organizations, form a 'social movement family'. Here the typical 'family' consists of an armed group and political party: Unkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and the African National Congress (ANC) (South Africa); Fatah with its opaque links to Tanzim (OPT); and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Sinn Féin (Northern Ireland). Germany diverged in that its Red Army Faction (RAF) had a unitary structure. Hereafter, unless otherwise indicated, 'SMO' is used to refer to the armed 'wing' of bifurcated structures, and 'movement' refers to the SMO and its linked party.
In social movement theory in general, successful organizations are characterized by a capacity to maximize uptake of human and material resources. Initiative by movement entrepreneurs is key, with decision-making assumed to accord with forms of rational actor models. Financial resources are typically easily obtained (through diasporas, bank robberies, or 'revolutionary taxes'); likewise, the world is awash with small arms. Th e critical element is human resource -at three levels: (1) recruits; (2) active supporters; and (3) societal elements displaying passive support, toleration, or neutrality in relation to the SMO's activities. What the SMO requires from (2) are accurate intelligence, safe houses, and weapons storage. From (3) what is primarily needed is an unwillingness to provide information to security agencies. Group size correlates with degree of structure: MK had a large paper membership
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(circa 23,000) and was highly structured; 25 the IRA was likewise highly structured, with a membership at any one time of around 1,500. 26 In both cases the number of fi ghters was much lower. Th e RAF probably had a few dozen members operating in loosely linked cells. 27 Th e second device key to social movement analysis is that of 'framing processes' -the 'conscious strategic eff orts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action'. 28 Encompassing a range of cultural and ideational elements, these provide shared frames of reference for members, with 'frame-diff usion' producing transmission between movements. Key to SMO growth are 'frame-alignment' processes -'strategic eff orts by [SMOs] to link their interests and interpretive frames with those of prospective constituents and actual or prospective resource providers'. 29 Depictions of state failings must strike a chord with potential supporters (frame resonance) and be suffi ciently grave (diagnostic framing) to sustain fi ghters (motivational framing) for 'armed struggle' leading to 'victory' (prognostic framing).
Th e third key analytical device is that of 'political opportunity structures' -the 'structures of political opportunities and constraints confronting the movement'. A critical issue here is the extent of banning, and censorship, and of limitations on assembly, and participation in parliament: banning armed groups is virtually certain, banning parties less so. In South Africa both MK and the ANC were banned; in Northern Ireland while the IRA was proscribed throughout, bans on Sinn Féin were eventually lifted (1975) . An insurgent movement is therefore likely to thrive (a) when resources are plentiful, and its structures facilitate maximum uptake; (b) when its framing processes resonate with targets of mobilization; and (c) when it can exploit openings (and perhaps closings) in the political opportunity structure. Under all three headings, entrepreneurship by movement activists is key.
In the rechtsstaat , these closings of political opportunity structures are likely to be cast as law. Yet simultaneously, law in the rechtsstaat provides potential openings via legal challenge to the closures. Th ough inevitably infl uenced by powerful social forces, Abel emphasizes how even in the former South Africa law could be considered to have had a 'relatively autonomous' 30 quality. It was therefore open to deployment 25 T Motumi and U we Sizwe, 'Structure, Training and Force Levels ' (1984-1994) 
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by the state's opponents to some degree, whether as shield (when defending prosecuted SMO members), or as a sword (when challenging restrictions). 31 In the rechtsstaat it is impossible to assess the political opportunity structure without regard to law. Radical groups' framing processes may also have important legal dimensions. Such key master-frames as 'rights' and 'injustice' almost invariably raise questions that demand legal answers (whether in condemning particular laws or in promising law based protection once the group wins).
Patterns of Mobilization
Within the social movement literature, the 'politics of contention' stream has well developed and sometimes empirically grounded analyses of mobilization and political violence. 32 Degrees of consensus are relatively high in some areas, and lower in others. Available analyses were developed by political scientists rather than lawyers. Few attempts were made to tease out legal dimensions, and published analyses are not limited to the rechtsstaat .
Some degree of consensus exists in relation to the following propositions:
(1) With such varieties of variables present in confl icted society there is no 'one size fi ts all' model to be applied mechanistically. (2) Having a 'cause' (typically evidenced by 'widespread discontent and dissatisfaction') 33 is a necessary but not suffi cient condition for mobilization. (3) Mass mobilization tends to occur in cycles. (4) A contingent relationship exists between mass mobilization and violent mobilization; this is linked to protestor 'backlash' after egregious repression and to the actions of movement 'entrepreneurs'. 34 (5) Once signifi cant violent mobilization occurs, political violence can rapidly become entrenched, and is likely to reach a plateau. (Table 2 ) . Th ese were largely peaceful, except in the OPT where mass mobilization involved signifi cant rioting from the outset. Germany had only one major period of mass mobilization.
In all a cause can be identifi ed (weakly in Germany), although in every instance its existence pre-dated mass mobilization (reinforcing the point that the cause, by itself, is insuffi cient). In South Africa the fi rst wave was in 1960, but the apartheid system had been formally instituted 12 years earlier. If the 'cause' is relatively constant, how to explain the beginnings of mass mobilization at particular times? Typically there is an event that appears to symbolize and crystallize the overall cause, a process occurring with greater or lesser input from movement entrepreneurs. In South Africa, the second wave of mobilization arose from the attempted imposition of compulsory secondary school education in the Afrikaans language. To black African students this was as an attempted exercise in white domination, and they rebelled accordingly. In Northern Ireland the trigger for the fi rst wave of mass mobilization is often considered to have been bans on radical political parades and associations, and an act of discriminatory public housing allocation. In Germany a key issue appears to have been the Vietnam war, prompting ideational development ('anti-imperialist', 'anti-fascist') that was turned against the German State.
Refl ecting the rechtsstaat quality of the case studies, there is some evidence of casting claims-making in legal terms. In South Africa initial mobilization contested the 'Pass Laws' (which restricted movement for Black Africans within South Africa). In Northern Ireland, 'civil rights' demands encompassed legal reforms, including repeal of the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Acts Northern Ireland 1922-43 (Table 1 ) Th ere was also evidence of cross-national frame-diff usion: mainstream Northern Ireland protesters borrowed from the American Civil Rights Movement, with a leftist minority modelling framing on ' les événements' in France and Germany (where students in turn borrowed framing from third world liberation movements). As regards collective action repertoires, during the mass mobilization phase the prime protest form in the case studies was the march (OPT, Germany, Northern Ireland, South Africa), with rent and rates strikes (Northern Ireland), strikes (OPT), school boycotts (South Africa), and rioting (all) also fi guring. 
Backlash
In some societies relatively peaceful mass demonstrations retain primacy in collective action cycles. In others (including the case studies), peaceful protest is replaced by degrees of violence, perhaps involving mass participation (OPT), and/or action by insurgent (South Africa, OPT, Northern Ireland) or terrorist (Germany) groups. In many of these situations it is relatively easy to show increases in violence immediately following employment of some egregious repressive technique. But of itself, this demonstrates no more than coincidence or simple correlation. Exploration of possible causal processes requires more sophisticated analytical techniques.
In the 'politics of contention' literature a variety of quantitative and qualitative techniques are employed to explore the issue, generating studies both of the eff ect of harsh (but bounded) state repression on collective protest action, and of more intense repression involving extensive use of lethal force. Quantitative methodologies involve assembling large volumes of data on the use of particular repressive techniques (for example, arrests and banning of marches), and on protest actions (for example, marches or rioting) over a defi ned time period. Regression analysis explores the possible relationship between the two over time using appropriate statistical tools. Th is chapter draws on three such studies from South Africa, the West Bank, and Northern Ireland. In all three the focus was less on immediate impact of repression on collective action, than on observable eff ects within time-limited periods ('lagged eff ects').
Hewitt's 1984 work covering Northern Ireland is the earliest and the least developed methodologically, 36 and since it also analysed four other confl ict sites 37 it is the thinnest in terms of volume of data per site. Th ese data (from 1970-1981) were gathered under three headings: 'terrorist measures and security force counter-measures', 'economic conditions', and 'signifi cant events' (for example, truces). 38 Th e 'eff ectiveness' of anti-terrorist measures was assessed by plotting levels of terrorist activity (a) over time, and (b) against some policy indicator (such as use of special courts). Th e OPT analysis relies on Khawaja's 1993 study of collective action and repression in the West Bank (Gaza was not included). A later study from the region is available, but as that focuses on only one tactic (suicide bombing), it is of less general applicability. 40 
In contrast to quantitative methodologies, qualitative techniques typically employ in-depth, semi-structured interviews with key actors; salient issues are identifi ed ('coded'), and, using dedicated software, trends are drawn out. Th is chapter draws on Campbell and Connolly's qualitative Northern Ireland study based on lifehistory interviews with 17 former IRA prisoners (mostly mid-level), and on Della Porte's study of political violence in Germany (and Italy), which involved the collection of 40 oral life histories and 100 written biographies of activists. Quantitative techniques are good for broad patterns and have the benefi ts of maximal objectivity. Qualitative techniques are better at teasing out the fi ne texture of human processes, though are inevitably more subjective. Deploying both techniques simultaneously in relation to the same phenomenon may permit degrees of cross checking ('triangulation') of fi ndings.
A critical question across these studies was whether state repression decreased, increased, or made no diff erence to levels of collective protest action? Olivier's conclusion was that South African repression tended to increase the rate of collective action. Th e mere presence of police at an event was found to increase subsequent collective action by 69 per cent. 42 It also appeared that the harshest repression was the least eff ective: where policed opened fi re, subsequent collective action increased by 107 per cent 43 over situations where police were not present.
Th ese fi ndings were echoed in Khawaja's study which found that many Israeli methods of repression increased collective action, though unevenly so. Where tear gas was used the increase was 44 per cent; dispersal of gatherings by force produced a 39 per cent increase: 'Instead of deterring protest, repression increased subsequent collective action'. 44 Th e strength of these studies is that they demonstrate links rather than simple correlations between some repressive techniques (particularly if indiscriminate or egregious) and increased collective protest action -the pattern is similar across all three. Only Hewitt measures impact on insurgent activity, but he omits the very start of the confl ict (1968) (1969) , and he makes little attempt to disaggregate such key events in 1971-1972 as the introduction of internment and Bloody Sunday. Th ese studies therefore leave largely unaddressed the question of how in some societies, terrorist or insurgent violence supersedes more peaceful forms of collective action (though Khawaja provides some pointers in his explanation of how protest action intensifi es). Some answers can be found in the qualitative 'activist' studies, but useful insights can also be gleaned from studies focusing on the eff ects of the egregious repressive technique: the massacre.
Early collective action theorization assumed that when repression became very harsh, potential demonstrators would assess the cost of protest as excessive (personally), In the OPT, the 'second Intifada' approximated to this pattern. In Northern Ireland the second wave of mass mobilization (around regimes for IRA prisoners ('H Block/ Armagh')) seems to have had similar consequences, even though the deaths (for which the state was blamed) resulted from hunger strikes rather than massacres. In others, it appeared that even one high profi le killing of a demonstrator or rioter could replicate the eff ect (OPT, fi rst Intifada; Germany) (Table 2 ). Overall, 'backlash' seemed to represent a signifi cant intensifi cation of a phenomenon already apparent in relation to ordinary indiscriminate repression.
How these quantitative studies fi t with relevant qualitative data can be explored by juxtaposing their conclusions with those in the Della Porta, and Campbell and Connolly, studies under four headings: (1) creating identity: repression and exclusion; (2) the uses of indiscriminate repression; (3) tipping factors for violent activism; and (4) entrepreneurship, structure, and framing.
Creating Identity: Exclusion and Repression
Both Della Porta, and Campbell and Connolly, explored activists' life histories, charting experience of the state and deepening radicalization; in each the issue of radicalization is closely linked to that of identity. Th e recurring picture is of the emergence of a sense of self as a member of a victimized group to the extent that membership comes signifi cantly to defi ne the self. In Germany exclusion had a strong sub-cultural (rather than ethnic) dimension. Della Porta emphasizes the importance of perceptions of exclusion and of persecution of protestors: '[a]ctivists felt that a "pogrom-like" attitude pervaded the population against "the students"'. Th e overall picture is of perceptions of closures of political opportunities; this was seen as occurring partly through state repression, and reinforced a sense of outgroup identity. None of this is to suggest a mechanistic relationship between out-group identity and repression; it is almost certainly more accurate to see it as a complex dialectical one, with repression aff ecting identity, and identity repression.
Th e Uses of Indiscriminate Repression
Early in the protest cycle numbers participating in relatively peaceful protests may vary, but few involve themselves in quasi-violent challenge to the state. Some protests remain at that stage -how then to explain why in others many more become drawn into protest, and some into violent activism? Th e case studies point to a common thread: the eff ect of relatively indiscriminate state repression -Khawaja's radicalized 'bystander' phenomenon (noted above): '[i]n the initial phase of a protest cycle only committed activists participate. But such encounters most often lead to the provocation of bystanders, for in responding to collective protests, the agents of control are likely to commit wrongdoings . . .' 55 In charting the deepening radicalization in Germany, Della Porta emphasizes the importance of perceptions of police brutality in public order situations beyond those immediately aff ected. As an activist put it: 'I had never been at a march . . . And there I saw three policemen who were beating a girl. I think if it had been a boy, I would not have felt so shocked.' 56
In the Campbell and Connolly data, respondents reported traumatic military house searches from childhood, sometimes involving entering an entire row. Some were described as professionally conducted, others as involving signifi cant abuse and humiliation of parents (particularly mothers 
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sexist abuse from soldiers. But this was rarely projected as propelling individuals into political violence. Rather the suggestion was that these experiences produced a much greater sense of self-identifi cation as part of a victimized community, contributing to intensifi cation of oppositional community cohesion.
Across all three case studies the process of deepening radicalization was intimately linked with rule of law degradation, though this was far more marked in the West Bank and Northern Ireland than in Germany. Degradation occurred when security force members acted outside the law (for instance with claimed police brutality in Germany); but it could also occur where they acted under security powers that in Northern Ireland and the OPT had been cast in 'catch-all', 'judge-proof ', and 'executive-oriented' ways, facilitating indiscriminate use.
Tipping Factors for Violent Activism
While rule of law degradation is linked to radicalization, nothing guarantees a continued deepening of the process; in Khawaja's formulation 'the translation of collective dispositions resulting from increased solidarity into action is by no means mechanical and instant'. 57 Most of the radicalized go no further than relatively peaceful protest action, but some make the leap to violent mobilization. In the case of the latter, the qualitative literature emphasizes a number of factors: principally killings of protestors ('backlash'), and prisoner issues (particularly deaths).
In Della Porta's study two shootings early in the protest cycle emerged as having profound eff ects: those of protestor Benno Ohnesorg shot by a policeman, and of student leader Rudi Dutschke by a right-wing extremist. In the words of one activist, '[t]he turning point of the state apparatuses, which was embodied in Ohnesorg's and Rudi's cases, proved that the state was ready to do anything and that its fascist face appeared'. 58 In Della Porta's view, 'the deaths were suffi cient to create the feeling (on the libertarian left) that 'they were fi ring at us'. 59 Such situations are open to manipulation not only by activists and by state operatives, but also by actors external to the confl ict. After Ohnesorg's death the policeman was tried (twice); his predictable acquittal seemingly conformed to the pattern of legal impunity during confl ict for state operatives' use of lethal force. Only in 2009 did it emerge that he had been a Stasi agent (whether he acted under orders from the organization is unclear). 60
In Campbell and Connolly's study the bulk of respondents had joined the IRA in one of two clusters, the fi rst of which was around the Bloody Sunday killings. But rather If identifi cation with prisoners was part of the Bloody Sunday dynamic, it was central to the second major pole of IRA recruitment in Campbell and Connolly's study: around prison protests and hunger strikes (ten died in 1981). What is notable is that hunger strikers' deaths seem to have had eff ects equivalent to deaths caused directly by the state. Germany manifested a similar dynamic. Among the factors Della Porta points to in explaining how the RAF was able to recruit and survive beyond the fi rst generation are resonance of political prisoner issues amongst targets of mobilization, including conditions of detention and prison deaths of RAF founders. In this context it is worth noting that while German security legislation was in general less wide ranging than in the other case studies, it was striking in its focus on isolating prisoners. Della Porta also emphasized the importance of the hunger strike, indeed there is an eerie echo in the comments of activists quoted in the two studies -Della Porta: '[t]he death of [hunger striker] Holger Meins and the decision to take up arms were one and the same thing. Refl ection was not possible anymore'; 63 and Campbell and Connolly: '[the hunger strike] crystallized my opinions and the decisions that you make, and I joined the IRA straight after the hunger strike'. 64 A fi nal factor emphasized by Della Porta was less the indiscriminate use of repression than its relatively discriminate, if wide ranging, use on those already radicalized: 'fear of arrest . . . was often itself the spur to joining an underground group'. 65
Entrepreneurship, Structure, and Framing
Th is is not to suggest that the process from prison/protest deaths to growth of the group was automatic. In all the case studies more than one armed opposition group existed (each potentially benefi ting from increased recruitment); but typically one Khawaja describes a similar dynamic: 'SMOs use authorities' provocations and harmful reactions to protesters as assets for long-term mobilization . . . [Th ey] capitalize on initial confl icts with authorities, using their outcomes as resources for further mobilization of support.' 67 Th is kind of entrepreneurship was also emphasized in Campbell and Connolly's study: '[i]ndiscriminate state repression appears as a low-cost benefi t to "violent entrepreneurs", since by defi nition it rarely hits activists, and frequently radicalizes the population from which challengers spring'. 68 As one republican activist put it, certain security force strategies provided 'the best recruiting tools the IRA ever had'. 69 A central paradox therefore emerges: a major resource provider for insurgent or terrorist groups may be the practices of the security forces charged with combating them.
Entrepreneurship may also be evident in relation to the political opportunity structure facing the group. For instance, banning or censoring an associated political party amounts domestically to closing political opportunities. Internationally however, movement entrepreneurs may use this ban to rally international support against such 'anti-democratic' practices. If so, the original closing is transformed into an opening.
Entrepreneurship is also central to the framing processes of eff ective groups. As discussed in Section 5, the literature emphasizes resonance and function as key issues. As regards the former, the challenge for movement entrepreneurs is to identify targets of mobilization (potential members or supporters), and ensure that frames employed resonate strongly with them. Th e 'injustice' master frame (the stock-in-trade of social movements), typically provides a starting point. Th e task of ensuring frame resonance is greatly assisted when the state exhibits the requisite behaviour. In Khawaja's formulation: 'In their eff orts to gain popular sympathy for the collective cause, . . . [SMOs] point to repeated acts of repression, as these acts ease their ask of constructing a bad "profi le" of the authorities.' 70 Th ese kinds of state failings typically represent rule of law degradation. Th e most potent example is in relation to the killings linked to the 'backlash' eff ect: the widely perceived unjustifi ability of these killings ensured maximum resonance for a variety of 'injustice'
66 Della Porta (n 51) 195. 67 Khawaja (n 41) 67 (original emphasis). frames. It is not suggested that blowback occurs because the infraction is identifi ed as specifi cally legal. Th e data tend to suggest that it is the perceived injustice of the killing(s) rather than their illegal quality that produces the mobilizing eff ects. Unlawfulness though, means that movement entrepreneurs can easily project the enemy state as 'hypocritical' (a rechtsstaat that murders), in a way that resonates powerfully. Th is resonance was amplifi ed by what appeared to be subsequent systemic rule of law failures. A pattern of lack of accountability is identifi able in South Africa, the West Bank, and Northern Ireland; the more ambivalent German situation has been noted above. In all, it was not simply a question of particular legal powers: it was also one of the overall legal regime that gave resonance to injustice frames.
In the OPT the principal diagnostic frame identifi ed the problem as 'occupation' (an assertion that coincided with the international law position). Th e IRA also employed 'occupation' frames although the British presence was not an occupation in international law. Th e frame nevertheless appears to have been eff ective early in the confl ict, since the 'Bloody Sunday' killings, and more quotidian experience of violent military house searches (signifying various degrees of 'rule of law' attrition) could be portrayed as typical 'occupiers' acts'. In South Africa it was simple to portray the apartheid state as 'racist', but after Sharpeville, and later Soweto, it could also be framed as 'murderous'. Diagnostic framing had to be grave for all of the movements because of its link to prognostic framing -invariably 'armed struggle' and political struggle to bring about a state that was sovereign (OPT and Northern Ireland), or non-racialist (South Africa). Correspondingly, motivational framing tended to be along 'onwards to national liberation' lines. In Germany, prognostic framing was extremely vague. Primarily this refl ected the RAF's ultra leftism, but there is also an organizational dimension: since the group had no associated political party there was little imperative to set out clear political programmes.
Concluding Th ought: Elements of an Integrated Anti-Violence Rule of Law Strategy
While the above points strongly to some link between rule of law degradation and political violence in situations of incipient or actual confl ict, it does not establish a relationship that is neat, linear, or automatic. Th e space between such repression and its possible result is punctuated by questions of agency, timing, and degree.
Repression appears least eff ective when it is indiscriminate and egregious, and when it is employed when mass mobilization (largely peaceful) has already occurred. At this point egregious repression (particularly killing protesters), seems to promote the shift by some into violent mobilization, and the consequent emergence of terrorist or insurgent groups. Th e state's continued use of indiscriminate repression seems to assist the fl ow of recruits to, and communal support or toleration for such groups. Likewise, indiscriminate or egregious repression appears to make it easier for the group to promote 'enemy state' images, in a way that resonates with actual or potential supporters. Banning or censoring parties associated with insurgent groups can eff ectively close off some domestic political opportunities, but may create political opportunities internationally.
Th is is not to say that harsh repression, antithetical to the rule of law, is always ineffective. After the post Bloody Sunday surge in violence, the Northern Ireland security forces were able to slow and then reverse the growth in IRA violence. Th ese relative successes were achieved largely through the mechanism of the 'confessions' of suspects tried in jury-less Diplock courts (special evidence rules applied). 71 De facto interrogation centres facilitated use of techniques not amounting to torture, but which probably constituted inhuman or degrading treatment. 72
Why were these practices apparently not counter-productive? First, the techniques were much more discriminate than in the early 1970s. Th e British Army still employed stop and search powers on a massive scale, but the most invasive techniques of mass repression, the curfew and saturation house searches, were completely or largely abandoned. Counter-productive eff ects almost certainly continued, but these appear to have been cancelled out by eff ects that were productive from the state's point of view. Security force shootings of IRA suspects in that period did not have eff ects equivalent to earlier killings of civilian protestors. Likewise it appears to have been more diffi cult for movement framers to create convincing 'enemy state' frames when internment and torture were no longer employed (though that changed with the H Block/Armagh prison campaign). Furthermore, several deliberate or botched IRA actions had caused signifi cant civilian casualties, 73 costing the organization much support.
Similar points could be made about the situation in the OPT and South Africa. While there are good grounds for suggesting that Israeli repression contributed signifi cantly to the fi rst Intifada's emergence and escalation, the IDF nevertheless ultimately contained the situation through harsh repression (even if containment only lasted until the second Intifada's emergence). Likewise, while the Sharpeville massacre was the spur for creating MK, and while the Soweto killings prompted fl oods of new recruits, the organization never posed a serious internal risk to the South African State; 74 harsh repression contained it. 74 Motumi (n 25). 75 Mass mobilization therefore occurs in cycles, and the emergence of terrorist or insurgent groups is linked to the declining phase of the cycle (and seems contingent on such 'tipping factors' as the state's killing demonstrators). Th erefore the longer the insurgent campaign continues, the greater the decline in the resources available to it from the original mass mobilization. It may be appropriate therefore to consider insurgent campaigns as constituting distinguishable protest cycles.
In the late 1970s, when IRA violence declined, repression seems to have been quite eff ective. What saved the IRA was reorganization (introducing cell structures), and the second cycle of mass mobilization around the hunger strikes. Th e decline in its violence stopped and the situation partly reversed, but there was no third cycle, and by the 1990s the organization's violence within Northern Ireland was declining (though more eff ective in Britain). Defi nitive assessments remain elusive: it is obvious in retrospect that the republican leadership had decided that more was to be gained from a peace process than from continuing violence; and there is much anecdotal evidence that the 'armed struggle' was being deliberately wound down. 76 Nevertheless, repression appeared more eff ective (particularly intelligence penetration); the state avoided any more 'Bloody Sundays,' and overt repression at least displayed signifi cant levels of rule of law adherence (even if increasing evidence of unlawful covert repression emerged). 77 Th is chimes (though not identically) with social theorist Zygmunt Bauman's conclusions: as regards Germany, 'the eventual falling apart of the Red Army Faction with its disappearance from German life, was brought about not by the repressive police actions; it was due to changed social conditions'. 78 And as regards Northern Ireland, 'the same may be said of the sad story of Northern Irish terrorism, obviously kept alive and growing in support thanks in large measure to the harsh military response of the British; its ultimate collapse could be ascribed to the Irish economic miracle and to a phenomenon similar to "metal fatigue", rather than to anything which the British Army did or was capable of doing'. 79 What all of this suggests is that for the rechtsstaat egregious and indiscriminate harsh overt repression always seems to have counter-productive eff ects overall. While strategies that entail lower levels of rule of law degradation can sometimes be eff ective, this seems largely limited to the declining phase of the violent protest cycle. In general, strategies that maximize rule of law adherence seem to pose the least risk of escalating confl ict in the early stages. Th ey also seem to off er the greatest possibility (a) for avoiding circumstances leading to further rounds of mass mobilization; and (b) of containing confl ict pending peace negotiations.
What then is the alternative to the kinds of security policies analysed above? What might a strategy aimed at minimizing the chances of confl ict escalation, and maximizing the chances for peace-making, look like? And how to advance beyond the trite formulation that 'all we need is full rule of law adherence'? A starting point is critical reappraisal of the state's role in confl ict. As discussed above, simple 'stimulus-response' models can have the eff ect of hiding the state's agency from itself. Th e empirical data analysed and referenced above demonstrate that state action is often key to confl ict escalation, and central to 'backlash' eff ects. Here states engage in violence rather than responding to that of others. For that reason this chapter focuses on 'anti-violence' rather than 'anti-terrorist' strategies. A conceptual leap is needed to seeing states during confl ict as inevitably agents, and sometimes violent ones: a crucial element in lessening violence is to make the state less violent. Th e question is related to that of how law is to be conceptualized? It is legitimate to see law as a norm-system, but this was never intended to provide an account of how law is perceived and manipulated by and between subaltern groups in confl ict situations. Th ere is a need to incorporate a view of law as a system of communications, and to pay careful attention to law's place in messaging and framing during confl ict.
In recent years 'radicalization' has become a dirty word -a staging post to terrorism. Yet during the last quarter millennium, only one of the world's radical governance ideas has seen off challenges from autocracy, fascism, and Leninism: it is democracy. To engage in mass protests (with degrees of radicalization inevitable), can be to express democratic impulses. In the case studies, while many were involved in mass protest, the numbers who switched to violent mobilization were much smaller. Th e issue is therefore not the radicalization, but the switch to violent mobilization. And in that context, it is imperative to realize that in the case studies, this switch was associated with 'backlash' following deaths for which the state was blamed.
As regards those who switch from peaceful protest to violence, the case studies point to the inadequacy of the 'mindless terrorist' formula. At the mid or upper levels, the data suggest strong entrepreneurial capacities in the more eff ective terrorist and insurgent groups -and a corresponding ability to exploit the state's mistakes. Th ese and other data support the hypothesis that key decision-making in such groups is best analysed under qualifi ed 'rational actor' models. While this might suggest increased dangerousness, it also opens the possibility that the group will choose peace as a way of doing politics if aff orded a political outlet, and if the state contains its violence.
Since a developed insurgency is famously diffi cult to defeat, the primary aim of an anti-violence strategy must be to avoid its initial eruption (most obviously by addressing grievances). But once protest mobilization has taken place it is critical to avoid the kind of acts identifi ed in the case studies as triggering 'backlash': killing protestors, and a cluster of prisoner issues. When insurgency has already taken root, the only feasible strategy is likely to be some engagement with the group, leading ultimately to a variety of 'peace process' -a settlement (with inevitable compromises) is to be negotiated by the state, the group, and others.
Law may have an important role to play here. Whereas in a strategy of 'repressive primacy' law may play a role in escalating confl ict, one of 'rule of law primacy' aims to ensure that law is strategically deployed to maximize potential for de-escalation (Table 3 ) . For instance, rule of law adherence minimizes the chances that 'enemy state' frames will resonate eff ectively, even in radicalized communities. Allowing some openings in the political opportunity structure may have the eff ect of suggesting further gains for the movement if it abandons violence. A prime requirement is likely to be that any political party associated with the SMO is, or remains, unbanned (providing what it is hoped will be the sole mobilizing structures in the future).
Th ere also needs to be reconsideration of how security powers are structured. Th e point was made above that the seesaw 'balance' metaphor frequently employed in 'anti-terrorist' discourse tends to have the eff ect of eviscerating rights to the point of obliteration in the case of 'suspected terrorists'. An alternative is to conceptualize the issue in triangular terms, with overall rights protection in a particular zone represented by the area enclosed by the triangle: the extent of a particular right (A-B) is currently defi ned by the distance from A to B; the two other rights with which it is linked are indicated by A-C and B-C so that A-B-C form a triangle (Figure 2 ) . If a need for a diminution of right A-B could be empirically demonstrated, this diminution could be compensated for by an enhancement of A-C and A-B, so that overall levels of rights protection (enclosed by the triangle) remain roughly the same. For instance, if an extended detention period for investigating off ences were permitted, a designated magistrate might be made actively responsible for ensuring detainees' freedom from ill-treatment, thereby amplifying rights of judicial access.
Variants of this approach could be applied across the spectrum of issues addressed in this chapter, from the structure of legal powers to operational matters. Where for instance it was thought necessary to deploy the military for security duties, civilians (not intelligence operatives) could be inserted at mid-levels in military command structures. Th eir purpose would be to provide oversight rather than command; but their presence could help to ensure that the military operated according to a peaceoriented strategy, rather than in accordance with deeply engrained 'war fi ghting' instincts.
Th e thrust of much of this chapter is to suggest that conventional 'anti-terrorist' legal discourse is severely impoverished. But analysis has gone beyond mere critique Colm Campbell 282 to demonstrate how reconceptualizing salient legal issues could enhance the confl ict-transformation potential of law, or at least limit its potential for confl ict escalation. In many violently confl icted societies the appropriate aim is not to 'defeat the enemy' (with law manipulated to that end), but rather to use law to bring the enemy into a better way of doing politics, and to bring the state into operating a (law based) model of human security compatible with it.
Recommendations
• Reconceptualize the state's role as an actor, acknowledging that its 'anti-terrorist measures' may have a capacity both to suppress terrorism and insurgency and to contribute to their escalation. In any given situation, the dominance of escalatory or of suppressive eff ects may fl uctuate over time.
• Empirical data link these escalatory eff ects to rule of law degradation, though the nexus is not automatic. Th e acts that seem to have greatest mobilizing eff ects (and therefore critical to avoid) are killing demonstrators (during the mass mobilization protest phase), and perceived prisoner abuse. Particular attention is therefore needed in relation to legal protections against prisoner abuse, and against the misuse of lethal force.
• Th e employment of hypotheticals is implicated in the promotion of these escalatory measures. Future strategies should abandon their use in favour of reliance on primary empirical data on terrorists and insurgents; on their violence; and on the eff ect of state action on the communities on which it impacts.
• Th is requires consideration of law as a system not only of norms, but also of communication.
• Simple 'balancing' metaphors for rights limitation in situations or insurgency and terrorism are inadequate. New models could provide that where a need is shown for limiting a right in a particular sphere, this limitation is compensated for by the enhancement of other rights, so that the overall level of rights protection in the area is maintained.
• Th ere is a need to reclaim the value of democratic radicalization. Empirical data suggest that while many are radicalized, few make the jump to violent mobilization; they also suggest that egregious acts of state repression are implicated in this shift. To demonize 'radicalization' as a concept may obscure the importance of that nexus.
• Th e end goal in situations such as those analysed is not to defeat the enemy, but rather to use law to bring the enemy into a better way of doing politics, and to bring the state into operating a model of human security compatible with it.
